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The Maine Public Utilities Commission (MEPUC) submitted the final Performance Based Regulations (PBR) report to the Legislature.  

From the Executive Summary:
“The purpose of the study is to evaluate the Performance Based Regulation (PBR) tools that may be used to regulate investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) in the state of Maine. 

One of the central findings of this report is that the MEPUC has already incorporated several PBR elements into its ratemaking structure. The MEPUC currently regulates the state’s IOUs with Performance Incentive Mechanisms (PIMs) in the form of Service Quality Indicators (SQIs), which apply to both utilities. The IOUs also have the option to file Multi-Year Rate Plans (MYRPs), such as Central Maine Power’s (CMP) current MYRP and the company’s former price cap. Furthermore, Maine’s utilities have implemented other alternative regulation tools such as Earnings Sharing Mechanisms (ESMs) and revenue decoupling. 

PBR tools have been used in other jurisdictions to address policy initiatives similar to the objectives of the MEPUC. Some of these regulatory approaches could be introduced to Maine, and others that are optional could be formalized or made mandatory. For example, by formalizing a basic structure for MYRPs and requiring the state’s utilities to follow this structure, the MPUC could create a regulatory framework in which utilities might gain more predictable revenues and obtain stronger incentives for cost control and innovation, while consumers might benefit from more stable rates, improved utility performance, and the potential for lower rates in the long run as efficiency gains are shared. New PIMs can be used to target specific policy objectives like resiliency, greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and renewable energy connections. 

However, while the adoption of PBR tools may provide improvements to the status quo regulatory framework in Maine, the introduction of new PBR tools would not guarantee such improvements. The realization of benefits from PBR requires a well-structured design that accounts for the particular circumstances of the jurisdiction or utility. For this reason, while case studies offer valuable insights, a plan that was successful for one utility will not necessarily replicate that success if applied identically to a different utility or in a different jurisdiction.”

Among other things the report further noted: 

1. “Maine’s IOUs already operate under mechanisms akin to PIMs under than name Service Quality Indicators (SQIs).” The report also indicated that these largely penalty-only incentives, “Maine could consider adopting reward-only or symmetrical PIMs to address policy goals currently not addressed in the existing regulatory framework.
2. The report also ”encouraged the IOUs to voluntarily propose indexed cap [multi-year rate plans (MYRPs)].”
3. recommended continuing to permit IOUs to “voluntarily file forecasted MYRPs,” with “consideration of MYRP terms longer than the two-year plan currently applied to CMP.” 
4. The report declined to recommend “IOUs pursue formula rate plans,” saying that they might be considered “if IOUs face major, lumpy investments and the frequency of rate cases becomes a problem.” 
5. The report recommended allowing “IOUs to file new PIMs as part of future rate applications, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.” 
6. The report recommended that “before instituting any mandatory PIMs or any PIMs that apply to all IOUs, [MEPUC] determine which specific policy goals might be addressed by PIMs and meet with stakeholders.”

Final PBR Report   
2025-00107
(Final Performance Based Regulations (PBR) Report.)