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In recent decisions some courts have held that text or SMS messages are not telephone calls.  These decisions have relied upon several prior interpretations and precedents.  Yet far more decisions have ruled otherwise.  And of course, many of these rulings seem to rely on different statutes, agency rules interpretations and reasoning to support their position.  And there is definitely disagreement whether the TCPA and the FCC rules even apply to text messages. 

It is impossible to keep up with all of these differing opinions.

More recently in the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025), district courts have found that a “text message” is not a “telephone call” under Section 227(c)(5) of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), which provides a private right of action to individuals registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry (“DNC”). Other courts have disagreed, following a long line of district court and FCC precedent interpreting “telephone call” to include text messages. While it is not clear whether these decisions signal a narrowing of Section 227(c)(5), they certainly highlight increasing uncertainty about the meaning and applicability of the TCPA and the FCC rules after McLaughlin.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin, many courts followed FCC guidance and interpreted 227(c)(5) to prohibit both text message and telephone calls to those registered on the DNC.

But in McLaughlin, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that “the default rule is that district courts in enforcement proceedings may conclude that an agency’s interpretation is incorrect.”  Rather than defer to FCC guidance, district courts must “determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.” Id. at 155.

The Court also held that “[c]ontrary to El Sayed’s contention that a natural reading of the term “tele-phone call” includes a “text message,” “it is only though the rulemaking authority of the FCC that the voice call provisions of the TCPA have been extended to text messages.”

The Court went on to note that a “District Court is not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025). Rather, “a district court must independently determine for itself whether the agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct. District courts are not bound by the agency’s interpretation but instead must determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation.”

“In interpreting a statute, we start with the plain language of the provisions to be interpreted.” Pugliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 550 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). “[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-temporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42.

“But if the text is clear, the analysis begins and ends there.” Davis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2025 WL 2491195, at *1 (Winser, J.) (N.D.Fla., 2025) (citing Young v. Grand Canyon Univ., Inc., 980 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2020)).

“I agree with and adopt Judge Winser’s opinion that “the statutory text here is clear, and a text message is not a ‘telephone call.’ ” “In addition to the fact that in common American English usage, a “telephone call” and a “text message” are separate and distinct forms of communication, the term “text message” appears elsewhere in the TCPA and related amendments, an appearance that confirms Congress understood the pertinent distinction and legislated mindful of the distinction.

“[W]hen Congress uses different terms, we expect that they hold different meanings, especially when the same meaning would render one of the terms superfluous.” Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 135 F.4th 939, 958 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024)). The omission of “text message” from paragraph 227(c)(5) confirms that the provision applies only to a “telephone call.”

Most recently in Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp., LLC et al. No. 1:25 CV 1282, 2026 WL 591842 (N.D. Ohio March 3, 2026) Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the Northern District of Ohio held that text messages are not “telephone calls” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).

Here the Court began by reviewing the plain meaning of “telephone call” at the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991.  Using the 1990 Merriam-Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, the Court found that “call” meant “the act of calling on the telephone” and “telephone” meant “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance.” Id. Under those definitions, the court concluded that text messages simply cannot be “telephone calls” because they don’t use a telephone to reproduce sounds at a distance. Id.

The Court criticized court decisions that used dictionary definitions of “call” from 2002 or later, rather than from 1991 when the statute was enacted. Relying upon prior precedents the Court held that the statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of statute’s enactment.

“Without any clear guidance from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court joins several others in holding that the term ‘telephone call’ as used in Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA does not encompass ‘text messages.’” Id. at *2.

Where else have courts ruled that a voice call does not equal a text message.  A judge in the Middle District of Florida recently dismissed Do-Not-Call claims under the TCPA, holding that “a text message is not a telephone call.” El Sayed v. Naturopathica Holistic Health, Inc., 2025 WL 2997759, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2025).

In Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, no:1:24-cv-01074,2025 WL 2042764 (C.D. Ill. July21, 2025) a federal court in July of 2025 dismissed Do-Not-Call claims that, “based on a plain reading of the TCPA and its implementing regulations,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) “does not apply to text messages.”

In arguing to dismiss the class action claim the defendant stated that Section 227(c) does not apply to text messages by noting that the phrases “text message” and “SMS message” are present in other parts of the statute but are wholly absent from Section 227(c). If Congress had intended to regulate text messages under Section 227(c), the defendant argued, it could and would have done so explicitly as it had done in other parts of the statute.

In Davis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2025 WL 2491195, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 2025 Aug. 26, 2025), the court also found that a text message is not a “telephone call” under § 227(c)(5), reasoning that “no ordinary person would think of a text message as a ‘telephone call.’” The court relied on the statutory text’s plain meaning and observed that Congress used “telephone call or message” elsewhere in the TCPA, but not in § 227(c)(5). The court rejected arguments based on FCC orders and legislative purpose, stating that “the best evidence of [Congress’s] purpose is the language of the statute itself.” Id.

Yet Many More District Courts Have Found “Text Messages = “Telephone Calls”

Yet it is important to emphasize that to date far more courts have relied on a holistic reading of the TCPA, its purpose, and dictionary definitions and have held that “text messages to a cellular telephone qualify as a ‘call’ within the meaning of the statute,” noting the Supreme Court’s recognition in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016) that text messages are calls for purposes of 227(b), and the Seventh Circuit’s similar holdings in other TCPA contexts.

Many decisions have also cited FCC guidance and a long line of district court precedent finding that a text call to a cell phone qualify as a call.

So, which is it?   Texts = Calls or Texts ≠ Calls?

To keep up on the shifting winds we recommend seeking assistance from experts in this area such as TCPAWorld for the latest happenings in this area.

Here it is important to seek expert legal assistance to help you navigate the ever shifting landscape.